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Abstract
The oblivious transfer primitive is sufficient to implement secure multiparty computation. However,
secure multiparty computation based only on classical cryptography is severely limited by the security
and efficiency of the oblivious transfer implementation. We present a method to efficiently and securely
generate and distribute oblivious keys by exchanging qubits and by performing commitments using clas-
sical hash functions. With the presented hybrid approach, quantum and classical, we obtain a practical
and high-speed oblivious transfer protocol, secure even against quantum computer attacks. The oblivious
distributed keys allow implementing a fast and secure oblivious transfer protocol, which can pave the
way for the widespread of applications based on secure multiparty computation.
1 Introduction
In Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC), several agents compute a function that depends on their own
inputs, while maintaining them private [1]. Privacy is critical in the context of an information society, where
data is collected from multiple devices (smartphones, home appliances, computers, street cameras, sensors,
etc.) and subjected to intensive analysis through data mining. This data collection and exploration paradigm
offers great opportunities, but it also raises serious concerns. A technology able to protect the privacy of
citizens, while simultaneously allowing to profit from extensive data mining, is going to be of utmost impor-
tance. SMC has the potential to be that technology if it can be made practical, secure and ubiquitous. Secure
multiparty computation demands extensive use of asymmetric cryptography primitives, which are considered
significantly more computationally complex than symmetric cryptography [2]. Besides that, in its current
standards, asymmetric cryptography cannot be considered secure anymore due to the expected increase of
computational power that a large-scale quantum computer will bring [3]. A large-scale quantum computer
can make it trivial to break current public key encryption and key exchange algorithms [4]. Although it
is still uncertain when a large-scale quantum computer will be available, small-scale quantum computers,
i.e., quantum computers with a limited number of qubits are already available commercially [5]. This rep-
resents a very serious threat and it has triggered several research initiatives to develop quantum-resistant
algorithms. These research initiatives have been following two paths, one based on the development of more
hard-to-break classical cryptographic algorithms [6] and another based on quantum protocols [7]. The former
is limited by the little understanding we have of the security of new post-quantum cryptographic algorithms
(particularly in the presence of quantum computers), and by the amount of computational resources needed
to implement them. The later is limited by the immaturity of quantum technologies. Here, we explore a
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Figure 1: In secure multiparty computation, N parties compute a function preserving the privacy of their
own input. Each party only has access to their own input-output pair.
hybrid approach, mixing both classical and quantum cryptography, and we show that this approach can
provide a quantum-resistant, practical and fast solution to support secure multiparty computation.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the connection between SMC and the
Oblivious Transfer (OT) primitive. In Section III, we define the concept of oblivious keys, and explain how
having pre-shared oblivious keys can significantly decrease the computational cost of OT during SMC. In
Section IV, we describe an efficient quantum protocol for oblivious key generation and distribution, the
security and efficiency of which is discussed in Section V and VI. Finally, Section VII, we summarize the
main conclusions of this work.
2 Secure Multiparty Computation and Oblivious Transfer
Let {P1, . . . , PN} be a set of agents and f(x1, x2, ..., xN ) = (y1, y2, ..., yN ) a multivariate function. For every
agent Pi, a SMC service (see Fig. 1) receives the input xi and outputs back the value yi in such a way that no
additional information is revealed about the remaining xj , yj , for j 6= i. Additionally, this definition can be
strengthened by requiring that for some number M < N of corrupt agents working together, no information
about the remaining agents gets revealed (secrecy). It can also be imposed that if at most M ′ < N agents
do not compute the function correctly, the protocol identifies it and aborts (authenticity). Some of the most
promising approaches towards implementing SMC are based on oblivious circuit evaluation techniques (such
as Yao’s garbled circuits) [8]. It has been shown that to achieve SMC it is enough to implement OT [9].
Furthermore, without additional assumptions, the security of the resulting SMC depends only on that of the
OT.
Let Alice and Bob be two agents. A 1-out-of-2 OT service receives stringsm0, m1 as input from Alice and
b as input from Bob, b ∈ {0, 1}, then outputs mb to Bob. This is done in a way that Bob gets no information
about the other message, i.e., mb, and Alice gets no information about Bob’s choice, i.e., the value of b [10].
Classical OT implementations, based on the use of asymmetric keys, suffer from two types of problems. The
first one is the efficiency: asymmetric cryptography relies on relatively complex key generation, encryption,
and decryption algorithms [11, Chapter 1], [12, Chapter 6]. This limits achievable rates of OTs, and since
implementations of SMC require a very large number of OTs [2, 13], this has hindered the development of
SMC-based applications. The other serious drawback is that asymmetric cryptography, based on integer
number factorization or discrete-logarithm problems, is insecure in the presence of quantum computers, and
therefore, it has to be progressively abandoned. There are strong research efforts in order to find other hard
problems that can support asymmetric cryptography [3]. However, while the security of these novel solutions
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is not fully understood, its complexity should prevent is massive usage to support SMC. A possible way to
circumvent this problem is by using quantum cryptography to improve the efficiency and security of current
techniques. Quantum solutions for secure key distribution, Bit Commitment (BC) and OT have been already
proposed [7]. The former was proved to be unconditionally secure (assuming an authenticated channel) and
realizable using current technology. Although, it was shown to be impossible to achieve unconditionally
secure quantum BC and OT [14–16], one can impose restrictions on the power of adversaries in order to
obtain practically secure versions of these protocols [17,18]. These assumptions include physical limitations
on the apparatuses, such as noisy or bounded quantum memories [19,20]. For instance, quantum OT and BC
protocols have been developed and implemented (see [21–25]) under the noisy storage model. Nevertheless,
solutions based on hardware limitations may not last for long, because as quantum technology improves the
rate of secure OT instances is going to decrease. Other solutions include exploring relativistic scenarios using
the fact that no information can travel faster than light [26–28]. However, at the moment, these solutions do
not seem to be practical enough to allow the large dissemination of SMC. A more promising approach is based
on the fact that, under the Quantum Random Oracle Model (QROM), it has been shown that OT can be
securely implemented using a quantum protocol [29]. From a practical point of view, the QROM corresponds
to the assumption that there exists a hash function, such as SHA-256, for which a quantum computer cannot
find collisions efficiently. Indeed, it is not believed that quantum computers have a significant advantage
in finding collisions for currently used cryptographic hash functions [30]. Thus, a way to achieve a secure
and fast rate of OT is by using quantum communications along with classical hash functions. This has the
potential to leverage SMC to a practical use.
3 Oblivious keys as a shared resource
As mentioned earlier, one of the more promising solutions for implementing SMC consists in describing
the function to compute as a logical circuit, which is then evaluated using the oblivious circuit evaluation
technique. In the worst case, this requires each party to perform one OT for each gate of the circuit being
evaluated. This number can be reduced by weakening the security or by increasing the amount of exchanged
data [31]. Either way, the OT cost of SMC represents a major bottleneck for its practical implementation.
To address this problem, we introduce the concept of oblivious keys. In this section, we will describe how
they can be used to delegate part of the computation outside of the main SMC protocol, and in the next
section, we will describe a quantum protocol for their distribution.
Let Alice and Bob be two agents. Oblivious Key Distribution (OKD) is a service that outputs to Alice
the string k = k1k2 . . . k` and to Bob the string k˜ = k˜1k˜2 . . . k˜` together with the bit string x = x1x2 . . . x`,
such that ki = k˜i whenever xi = 0 and k˜i does not give any information about k whenever xi = 1. All of
the strings are chosen at random for every invocation of the service. A pair (k, (k˜, x)) distributed as above
is what we call an oblivious key pair. Alice, who knows k, is referred to as the sender, and Bob, who holds
k˜ and x, is the receiver. In other words, when two parties share an oblivious key, the sender holds a string
k, while the receiver has only approximately half of the bits of k,
When two parties share an oblivious key pair of length `, they can use it to send messages of length
r < `/2 via OT. This can be securely performed using the protocol in Fig. 2. This protocol is significantly
faster than current implementations of OT without any previous shared resource. Note that the agents
can perform, previously or concurrently, an OKD protocol to share a sufficiently large oblivious key, which
can be then partitioned and used to perform as many instances of OT as needed for SMC. This effectively
reduces the overall cost of the OTs during the circuit evaluation, but does not make the whole endeavour
faster unless there is a fast way of sharing such oblivious keys. Fortunately, it is possible to achieve fast
oblivious key exchange if the parties have access to fast and secure communications and commitments, which
can be implemented through a photonics quantum communication channel and quantum computer resistant
classical hash functions.
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Protocol piOK→OT
Parameters: Integers `, r < `/2, a universal hash function family F onto {0, 1}r.
Parties: The sender Alice and the receiver Bob.
Inputs: Alice gets two strings m0,m1 ∈ {0, 1}r. Bob gets a bit b.
Setup phase
1. Alice calls an OKD service, which, from an oblivious key (k, (k˜, x)) of length `, sends k to Alice and k˜, x to
Bob.
Main phase
2. Bob defines the two sets I0 = {i | xi = 0} and I1 = {i | xi = 1}. Then, he sends to Alice the ordered pair
(Ib, Ib⊕1).
3. Alice samples f0, f1 ∈ F and sends to Bob (s0, s1), where si = mi ⊕ fi(k|Ib⊕i).
4. Bob outputs mb = sb ⊕ fb(k|I0).
Figure 2: Oblivious transfer from a shared oblivious key. Observe that k|Ii denotes the substring of k formed
by the kj with j ∈ Ii.
4 Oblivious key distribution protocol
In this section, we describe how to share an oblivious key pair by exchanging qubits. The protocol in Fig. 3
is based on the standard randomized quantum oblivious transfer protocol [32], with the difference that it
uses hash functions as a resource to implement commitments and it outputs an oblivious key instead. The
two logical qubit sates |0〉 and |1〉 represent the computational basis, and the states |+〉 = (|0〉 + |1〉)/√2,
|−〉 = (|0〉 − |1〉)/√2 represent the Hadamard basis. We also define the states |(si, bi)〉 for si, bi ∈ {0, 1}
according to the following rule:
|(0, 0)〉 = |0〉 |(0, 1)〉 = |+〉
|(1, 0)〉 = |1〉 |(1, 1)〉 = |−〉.
Note that these states can be physically instantiated using, for instance, a polarization encoding fiber op-
tic quantum communication system, provided that a fast polarization encoding/decoding process and an
algorithm to control random polarization drifts in optical fibers are available [33].
Intuitively, this protocol works because the computational and the Hadamard are conjugate bases. Per-
forming a measurement in the preparation basis of a state, given by bi, yields a deterministic outcome,
whereas measuring in the conjugate basis, given by b¯i, results in a completely random outcome. By prepar-
ing and measuring in random bases, as shown in steps 1 and 2, approximately half of the measurement
outcomes will be equal to the prepared states, and half of them will have no correlation. As Alice sends
the information of preparation bases to Bob, he gets to know which of his bits are correlated with Alice’s.
Steps 3 to 6 instantiate a commit/open subprotocol piCOMH (see [34]) that spends part of the shared bits to
ensure that Bob measures all qubits as intended and the resulting strings will have the desired properties.
The test described in step 6) of piOKD checks whether the outcomes of Bob’s measurement always coincide
with Alice’s generated states whenever the measure-generation bases are the same. In real implementations
of the protocol one should consider imperfect sources, noisy channels, and measurement errors. Thus, in this
step Alice should perform parameter estimation for the statistics of the measurements. Following this, Alice
and Bob perform standard post-processing techniques of information reconciliation and privacy amplification
before continuing to step 7). For the former, LDPC codes or the cascade algorithm can be used, and the
latter can be done with universal hashing.
Note that this protocol can be iterated several times and the concatenation of all the outputs results
in a single larger oblivious key. This key can then be re-partitioned as needed for SMC purposes. Parties
expecting to engage in multiparty computation can share these keys beforehand and spend them as needed
to perform OTs with flexibility on the size of the strings.
4
Protocol piOKD
Parameters: Integers n,m < n, `, and a cryptographic hash function H.
Parties: The sender Alice and the receiver Bob.
Inputs: Alice and Bob get no inputs.
1. Alice samples s, b ∈ {0, 1}n+m. For each i ≤ n + m she prepares the state |φi〉 = |(si, bi)〉 and sends |φ〉 =
|φ1φ2 . . . φn+m〉 to Bob.
2. Bob samples b˜ ∈ {0, 1}n+m and, for each i, measures |φi〉 in the computational basis if b˜i = 0, otherwise
measures it in the Hadamard basis. Then, he computes the string s˜ = s˜1s˜2 . . . s˜n+m, where s˜i = 0 if the
outcome of measuring |φi〉 was 0 or +, and s˜i = 1 if it was 1 or −.
3. For each i, Bob samples randomly rs˜i , rb˜i ∈ {0, 1}` and computes H(s˜irs˜i) and H(b˜irb˜i). Then, he sends all
the hashed values to Alice.
4. Alice chooses randomly a set of indices T ⊂ {1, . . . , n+m} of size m and sends T to Bob.
5. Bob reveals to Alice all the s˜j , b˜j and rs˜j , rb˜j for which j ∈ T .
6. For each j ∈ T , Alice checks whether the hash values of the revealed information coincide with the hash values
sent previously by Bob. Then, she checks if sj = s˜j whenever bj = b˜j . If either of these tests fails, Alice aborts
the protocol.
7. Alice sends b∗ = b|T to Bob and outputs k = s|T .
8. Bob computes x = b∗ ⊕ b˜|T , k˜ = s˜|T , and outputs (k˜, x).
Figure 3: Oblivious key distribution protocol based on a secure communication channel provided by the
exchange of qubits and secure commitments provided by the use of classical hash functions.
5 Security
We analyze the composable security of the resulting OT obtained using piOK→OT from an oblivious key
produced by piOKD. We refer to the composition of these two protocols as the Hybrid Oblivious Keys
(piHOK) protocol. Fig. 5 shows a diagram of the security relations between piHOK , hash functions, and OT.
Note that authenticated classical channels are assumed available during the protocol execution, which is a
standard requirement for any protocol that realizes OT.
The piHOK protocol is closely related to the standard Quantum OT protocol piQOT , which is proven
statistically secure in the quantum composability framework [32]. The difference between the two being
that piQOT uses ideal commitments, as opposed to the hash-based commitments in piHOK . In the context
of the Random Oracle Model (ROM), the commitment subprotocol piCOMH is computationally secure and
universally composable under the assumption that the hash function is cryptographic [34] (the outcome of
the hash function is random: it cannot be predicted for each input, although if the same input is given to
the hash function, it produces the same output). The ROM is acceptable in the quantum setting, as it has
been shown that a quantum computer does not have any significant advantage in finding collisions when
compared with a classical one [30]. This means that piHOK securely realizes OT against computationally
bounded classical and quantum adversaries.
One point to note about the security of piOKD is that is not susceptible to intercept now-decrypt later style
attacks. This means that attacking the protocol by finding collisions of the hash function is only effective if
it is done in real time, that is, between steps 3) and 5) of the protocol. This is in contrast to asymmetric
cryptography based OT, in which Bob can obtain the whole key if he is able to overcome the computational
security at a later time.
6 Efficiency
One of the major bottlenecks in using Yao’s garbled circuits is the number of instances of OT required.
A single Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) circuit can be obtained with the order of 106 instances of
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Figure 4: Quantum oblivious keys. Alice knows the entire key, Bob only knows half of the key, but Alice
does not know which half Bob knows.
OT. However, with current solutions, i.e., with computational implementations of OT based on asymmetric
classical cryptography, one can generate ∼ 103 secure OTs per second in standard devices [35]. It is possible
to use OT extension algorithms to increase its size up to rates of the order of 106 OT per second [2], which
is still too slow for moderately complex applications, such as private data mining. Several of this techniques
are based on symmetric cryptography primitives [35], such as hash functions, and could also be used to
extend the OTs generated by piHOK .
Due to the popularity of crypto-currencies, fast and efficient hashing machines have recently become
more accessible. Dedicated hashing devices are able to compute SHA-256 at rates of 1012 hashes/s (see
Bitfury, Ebit, and WhatsMiner, for example). In addition, existent standard Quantum Key Distribution
(QKD) setups can be adapted to implement OKD since both protocols share the same requirements for
the generation and measurement of photons. Notably, QKD setups have already demonstrated secret key
rates of the order of 106 bits per second [36–40]. Is also worth mentioning that, as opposed to QKD, OKD
is useful even in the case where Alice and Bob are in the same location. This is because in standard key
distribution the parties trust each other and, if in the same location, they can just exchange hard drives
with the shared key, whereas while sharing oblivious keys, the parties don’t trust each other and need a
protocol that enforces security. Thus, for the cases in which both parties being in the same location is not
an inconvenience, the oblivious key rates can be further raised, as the effects of channel noise are minimized.
Direct comparisons of OT generation speed between asymmetric cryptography techniques and quantum
techniques are difficult because the algorithms run on different hardware. Nevertheless, as quantum technolo-
gies keep improving, the size and cost of devices capable of implementing quantum protocols will decrease
and their use can result in significant improvements in the efficiency of OTs in the short-to-medium term
future.
7 Conclusions
Motivated by the usefulness of SMC as a privacy-protecting data mining tool, and identifying its OT cost
as its main implementation challenge, we have proposed a potential solution for practical implementation
of OT as a subroutine SMC. The scheme consists on pre-sharing an oblivious key pair and then using it to
compute fast OT during the execution of the SMC protocol. We call this approach hybrid because it uses
resources traditionally associated with classical symmetric cryptography (cryptographic hash functions), as
well as quantum state communication and measurements on conjugate observables, resources associated with
quantum cryptography. The scheme is secure as far as the chosen hash function is secure against quantum
6
πHOK
πQOT
String Commitment
Oblivious Transfer
πOK→OT
πOKD
πCOMH 
UC-secure in the quantum
framework
Equivalent up to the security
of the hash function
Computationally 
 secure
Figure 5: Analysis of the composable security of OTs obtained using the Hybrid Oblivious Keys protocol.
The OTs are implemented with pre-computed Oblivious Keys that are distributed using the Oblivious Key
Distribution protocol piOKD. The security of piOKD is equivalent to the security of the hash functions, which
have been shown to be secure against computationally bounded classical and quantum adversaries.
attacks. In addition, by comparing the state of current technology with the protocol requirements, we
concluded that it has the potential to surpass current asymmetric cryptography based techniques.
Future work includes designing an experimental setup, meeting the implementation challenges, and ex-
perimentally testing the speed, correctness, and security of the resulting oblivious key pairs. This includes
computing oblivious key rate bounds for realistic scenarios and comparing them with current alternative
technologies.
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